

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 EURE-00 IO-12 OIC-04 SSO-00 NSCE-00

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C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 1458

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UNSL, PN VO YU

SUBJ: US DEMARCHE RE: YUGOSLAV ROLE AT SECURITY COUNCIL
MEETING IN PANAMA

REF STATE 61953

1. I MET WITH FOREIGN SECY MINIC TODAY AT 1330 TO MAKE DEMARCHE WITH REGARD YUGOSLAV ROLE AT SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON PANAMA. MEETING LASTED 50 MINUTES DESPITE FOREIGN SECY' S FULL SCHEDULE WITH ARRIVAL TODAY OF POLISH FONMIN OLSZOWSKI FOR OFFICIAL TALKS. MINIC WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMERICAS DIVISION DIRECTOR KREACIC, INTERPRETER AND NOTETAKER.
 2. I TOLD MINIC THAT NATURALLY I WAS ACTING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS OF MY GOVERNMENT AND WHILE FULLY AWARE OF THE DEMANDS ON HIS TIME I HAD SOUGHT AN APPOINTMENT WITH HIM IN ORDER TO UNDERLINE THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH MY GOVT REGARDED YUGOSLAVIA' S BEHAVIOR BEFORE AND AT THE RECENT SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING IN PANAMA. I THAN SPOKE ALONG LINES OF REFTEL, PREFACING MY REMARKS WITH OBSERVATION THAT I WAS SURE BOTH SIDES FELT STRONGLY THEY SHOULD AVOID ANY ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT POSSIBLY JEOPARDIZE OR WORSEN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND IT WAS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT I WAS MAKING THE DEMARCHE.
 3. MINIC SAID THAT AT THE OUTSET HE WISHED TO ASSURE ME THAT NEITHER
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HE NOR ANYONE IN YUGOSLAV GOVT DESIRED ANYTHING BUT THE BEST OF RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND IT WAS A SOURCE OF REGRET TO HIM THAT MY GOVT SHOULD REGARD MOJSOV' S BEHAVIOR IN NEW YORK AND PANAMA AS REFLECTING ILL WILL TOWARD THE UNITED STATES ON THE PART OF YUGOSLAV GOVT. NATURALLY, AS I HAD POINTED OUT, YUGOSLAVS AND WE HAD DIFFERING VIEWS ON A NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES BUT THIS WAS NO REASON FOR ONE SIDE TO ACT IN A WAY DELIBERATELY TO DAMAGE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE OTHER SIDE. MINIC FELT THAT THE YUGOSLAV POSTURE IN NEW YORK AND PANAMA COULD NOT SO BE CLASSIFIED AND HE MUST THEREFORE REJECT ANY CRITICISM OF MOJSOV' S BEHAVIOR.

4. I HAD SPOKEN OF YUGOSLAVIA' S UNWILLINGNESS TO JOIN US IN PREVENTING SC MEETING IN PANAMA. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT EARLY IN THE GAME IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE SC MEMBERS FAVORED SUCH A MEETING, YUGOSLAVS THEMSELVES SAW CONSIDERABLE MERIT IN SUCH A MEETING AS IT VIEWED ADDIS ABABA SESSION AND THEREFORE FELT IT SERVED NO USEFUL PURPOSE TO ATTEMPT TO BLOCK IT. WITH REGARD TO OUR CRITICISM OF YUGOSLAV ENCOURAGEMENT OF ATTENDANCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF GUYANA, JAMAICA AND MEXICO, MINIC SAID THAT HE WAS FLATTERED TO THINK THAT WE CONSIDERED YUGOSLAVIA TO HAVE SUCH INFLUENCE. THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER WAS THAT THESE FONMINS HAD ALREADY DECIDED TO ATTEND SC MEETING AND MOJSOV IN HIS VISITS TO THE THREE CAPITALS HAD SIMPLY ENDORSED THEIR DECISION. CONCERNING YUGOSLAV BEHAVIOR AT THE MEETING IT-SELF, I SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT MOJSOV WAS UNDER CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS TO TEMPER THE APPETITES OF CERTAIN LATIN AMERICAN DELEGATES FOR A TOUGH ANTI- U. S. RESOLUTION AND TO DO HIS BEST TO WORK OUT A DRAFT WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT FEEL OBLIGED TO VETO. WITH REGARD TO OUR COMPLAINT ABOUT MOJSOV' S MARCH 21 STATEMENT, MINIC WOULD RECOMMEND THAT WE PAY LESS ATTENTION TO INDIVIDUAL WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS AND EXAMINE THE STATEMENT IN ITS ENTIRETYM ON CLOSE EXAMINATION OF U. N. RHETORIC ONE COULD ALWAYS FIND CAUSE FOR COMPLAINT; HE HIMSELF RECALLED VERY VIVIDLY HIS OWN DAYS IN THE UN WHEN VYSHINSKY WAS VOICING HIS INTEMPERATE DIATRIBES AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA. MINIC HASTENED TO ADD THAT HE WAS NOT DRAWING ANY PARALLELS BETWEEN VYSHINSKY' S PERFORMANCE AND MOJSOV' S MARCH 21 STATEMENT.

5. MINIC SAID THAT HE COULD NOT RECALL IN DETAIL WHAT MOJSOV HAD SAID BUT HE WOULD DOUBT VERY SERIOUSLY THAT OUR CHARGE THAT HIS WORDS AMOUNTED TO " INCITATION TO VIOLENCE" COULD BE SUPPORTED. IT WAS HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT IT WAS OUR VETO WHICH HAD INFLAMED THE EMOTIONS OF THE PANAMANIAN PEOPLE AND HAD THUS

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WORSENE PROSPECTS FOR REACHING A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE BETWEEN THE PANAMANIAN AND OURSELVES.

6. IN ANY CASE, MINIC HOPED THAT SOMEHOW OR OTHER WE COULD RESOLVE OUR PROBLEMS WITH PANAMA ON A BILATERAL BASIS AND THAT FURTHER RECOURSE TO THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. IF WE SHOULD SUCCEED, THE YUGOSLAVS WOULD BE AMONG THE FIRST TO CONGRATULATE US AS THEY HAD RE VIETNAM DESPITE THEIR DISAPPROVAL OF OUR APPROACH AND TACTICS. HE REGRETTED THAT WE FELT IT NECESSARY TO MAKE OUR DEMARCHE AND HE REITERATED HIS REJECTION OF OUR CRITICISM OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVT'S POSTURE AND MOJSOV'S BEHAVIOR BOTH IN NEW YORK AND IN PANAMA. THE ONE POSITIVE ASPECT OF OUR MEETING TODAY HE SAID WAS THE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IT OFFERED OF OUR CONTINUED WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES IN A FRANK AND OPEN MANNER.

7. I ENDED THE MEETING BY SAYING THAT I TOO REGRETTED THE NECESSITY FOR MY DEMARCHE TODAY. I WOULD POINT OUT THAT I HAD NOT INTENDED BY MY REMARKS TO LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE REGARDED YUGOSLAV BEHAVIOR AS MOTIVATED BY ILL WILL TOWARD THE UNITED STATES; IF IN FACT I HAD SAID THIS I WOULD NOW CORRECT THE RECORD BY STATING THAT WE REGARDED YUGOSLAV BEHAVIOR AS UNHELPFUL. CERTAINLY I AGREED WITH MINIC THAT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF OUR GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS WAS A WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF BOTH SIDES TO AIR AND TO DISCUSS FRANKLY ANY GRIEVANCES THAT ONE SIDE MIGHT HAVE AGAINST THE OTHER. FINALLY, I WOULD HOPE THAT IN THE FUTURE, YUGOSLAVIA WOULD IN ITS APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL ISSUES TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE U. S. POSITION ESPECIALLY WHERE DIRECT UNITED STATES INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED- AS WAS THE CASE AT PANAMA. CERTAINLY WE WERE PREPARED TO TAKE THE SAME APPROACH WITH REGARD TO YUGOSLAVIA.

TOON

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